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Countermeasures, or techniques for hiding guilt during a credibility assessment examination, have long 
been an important topic in cognitive psychology and criminal justice fields. With recent IS research on 
automated screening systems, understanding the potential for countermeasures in this new paradigm is of 
increasing importance. This paper reports on a large experiment examining countermeasures in an 
automated deception detection screening context. The effectiveness of traditional countermeasure types 
(mental and physical) are examined, as well as an exploratory approach of trying several countermeasures 
at once. The exploratory approach was tested to investigate a proposed novel systems-inspired solution to 
countermeasures—triangulating on deception likelihood using multiple sensors measuring multiple 
behavioral and psychophysiological anomalies. The findings give credence to the proposition that 
monitoring multiple heterogeneous cues to deception may be a viable solution for mitigating the 
effectiveness of countermeasures.  
Keywords: Countermeasures Mitigation Systems, Deception Detection Systems, Automated Screening 
Systems, Automated Screening Kiosk  
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Introduction 
For almost as long there have been systematic methods for detecting deception, there have been tools for 
mitigating their effectiveness. This is especially true for the polygraph, which is the most widely known 
and widely used technology designed to augment human interviewers in credibility assessment (Honts 
and Perry 1992). Research suggests that countermeasures can be effectively used against the traditional 
polygraph sensors for both the Control Question Technique (CQT) as well as the Concealed Information 
Test (CIT) method of interviewing (Ben-Shakhar and Dolev 1996; Elaad and Ben-Shakhar 1991; Honts and 
Kircher 1994; Honts et al. 1987). 
The effectiveness of countermeasures have been of particular interest to the cognitive psychology and 
criminal justice fields, and now is of increasing interest to IS research investigating systems solutions to 
integrity screening and credibility assessment systems. New system designs are being evaluated and 
validated for the purpose of conducting more rapid, non-contact credibility assessment interviews, and to 
gain more insight into the underlying mechanics of credibility assessment (Derrick et al. 2011; Nunamaker 
et al. 2011; Twyman 2012; Twyman et al. 2011b). For example, eye tracking and vocalic measures of 
deception and concealed information have been a focus of recent automated interviewing research (Elkins 
et al. 2012b; Nunamaker Jr et al. 2012; Proudfoot et al. 2012; Proudfoot et al. 2013; Twyman et al. 2013), 
and have provided new insights into psychophysiological and behavioral correlates of deception. As 
non-contact, automated credibility assessments emerge as an enticing option for managing security and 
integrity, it is critical to identify and investigate possible countermeasures that may be employed. 
This paper presents the findings of a study designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a variety of 
countermeasures against a system interaction designed to identify deception and concealed information. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: (1) we discuss relevant deception detection and 
countermeasures literature, (2) we outline our research approach, which includes a high-level system 
design and laboratory experiment used to test countermeasures against an array of sensors, (3) we present 
the results of the experiment, and (4) we review the contributions, limitations, and conclusions of this 
work. 
Literature Review 
Technology has been used in credibility assessment interviews since at least 1895, when Cesare Lombroso, 
an Italian criminologist, used a medical device for measuring blood pressure changes during police 
interrogations (Trovillo 1939). In the 1920s and 30s, John Larson and Leonarde Keeler developed the 
now-widely-known polygraph machine which measures blood pressure, respiration, and skin conductance 
(a measure of arousal) (Alder 1998). Polygraph systems have since become the standard tool and decision 
support system for credibility assessment interviews. The polygraph and its associated control question 
technique of interviewing have not undergone major updates for many decades. Limitations to this current 
paradigm limit the potential application and usefulness of human credibility assessment. Research in 
several fields is seeking to update and improve upon existing knowledge and practices in this area of 
research, which has potential for high impact. Because of a general scientific consensus that the most 
common polygraph technique lacks validity (Iacono and Lykken 1997; National Research Council 2003), 
much academic research on credibility assessment focuses on alternative techniques such as the CIT that 
feature more control (Lykken 1998; MacLaren 2001; Rosenfeld and Labkovsky 2010b; Twyman et al. 
2011b; Twyman et al. 2010; Vrij 2008).  
Technology can clearly improve deception detection accuracy. Unaided human deception detection 
accuracy rates hover near chance levels (Bond and DePaulo 2006). Decision support or fully automated 
credibility assessment are an important area where IS research can make a substantial impact. Recently, 
additional technologies for human screening have been investigated, including non-contact technologies 
for measuring heart rate and blood pressure (Nunamaker et al. 2011), vocalic features (Elkins and 
Burgoon 2010; Gamer et al. 2006; Harnsberger et al. 2009), linguistic variables (Fuller et al. 2009; Vizer 
et al. 2009; Zhou and Zhang 2008), oculometric factors (Fukuda 2001; Osher 2007; Twyman 2012), 
thermal features (Pavlidis et al. 2002; Pavlidis and Levine 2002), and kinesic factors (Meservy et al. 2005; 
Twyman et al. 2011b). Beyond individual technologies, automated system designs are now beginning to be 
2 
proposed, designs that cover the interview protocol, technologies, and interaction facilitation (Derrick et 
al. 2011; Nunamaker et al. 2011; Twyman et al. 2011a).  
Just as no veracity cue has proven to be a “pinnochio’s nose,” or guaranteed sign of deception, no single  
technology seeking to measure a physiological or behavioral process will be foolproof. It is thus critical 
that research in this area be contextualized, clearly explaining boundaries and limitations for a given 
design or approach. For the current study, we focus on fully automated screening system interviews, and 
specifically automated systems employing a CIT-based interview.  
The human-computer interaction (HCI) with automated screening systems is of particular importance, 
because the system must comprehend and adapt to signals from the human that are not traditionally 
monitored, such as body language or vocal patterns (Derrick et al., 2011). The best human signals to 
monitor need to be identified. Because of the lack of a single clear signal indicating deception, many 
signals will need to be monitored simultaneously. Perhaps most importantly, the interaction itself must be 
specially designed to elicit valid signals (Twyman et al., 2011a). 
An important aim of this research is to gain a greater understanding of the robustness of the system 
interaction design when users attempt to manipulate the system in their favor. Unlike traditional 
human-computer interactions where the system supports the user or the system and user complement one 
another (Nass, Fogg, and Moon, 1996), the HCI of an automated screening system can at times consist of 
the system and human trying to reach opposite goals. In such cases, the way the individual interacts with 
the system will be strongly affected by their knowledge of the system’s monitoring and their own 
countermeasures, or tactics employed to counter the system’s screening effectiveness. Understanding such 
tactics and their effectiveness will provide insight into future iterations of the system and interaction 
design. For instance, a recent conceptualization of as HCI framework for automated screening systems 
mimics human interpersonal interactions, considering humans will interact with such systems as they 
would another person (Derrick et al., 2011), reflecting the Computers-are-Social-Actors (CASA) paradigm 
(Sundar and Nass, 2000; Reeves & Nass, 1996). However, when an individual is highly motivated to 
counter or subvert a system, he or she will more strongly consider the source of the interview, and 
therefore may not view the system as a social actor (Liang et al, 2013), but rather as a tool to be 
manipulated. The tactics taken by a user, then, would produce different observable behaviors than a 
manipulation seen in an interpersonal communication, especially if the manipulator understands how the 
automated screening system works. 
Automated screening systems are a novel solution to novel contexts, and as such, much research is needed 
in this area. To the extent countermeasures are found to be effective, the system and interaction design 
will need to be specified for the detection of, adaptation to, or minimization of the effectiveness of 
countermeasures. In the remainder of this section we review deception theory generally and CIT-based 
screening systems in particular, then focus on countermeasures and how they relate to several promising 
non-contact technologies used in recent automated screening systems research. 
Deception Theory 
Deception occurs in many forms. For example, it can take the form of exaggeration, white lies, 
equivocation, complete fabrications, and impostership. We define deception as an intentional 
transmission of a message intended to foster false beliefs or perceptions in the recipient (Knapp & 
Comadena, 1979). This definition of deception emphasizes the involvement of both a sender and receiver 
during a deceptive interaction. During this interaction, deception theories explain and predict verbal, 
nonverbal, and physiological behavior differences between truthtellers and deceivers. 
The earliest investigations into deception, from which modern theories have stemmed, were conducted by 
Ekman and Friesen (1969). They introduced their leakage hypothesis that predicted liars when 
experiencing arousal, negative affect, and stress would leak unintentional cues that would manifest 
particularly in the hands, legs, and feet. While experiencing these negative feelings, liars relieve their 
tension and discomfort through adaptors (i.e., foot tapping, touching of face). In addition to additional 
arousal induced behaviors, the leakage hypothesis predicts that liars will also inhibit certain behaviors and 
natural gesturing.  
3 
Later, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981) extended this hypothesis with their Four-Factor theory 
to more directly explain the causes for the behavior differences between liars and truthtellers. This theory 
predicts leakage behavior is caused by 1) arousal, 2) negative affect, 3) cognitive effort, and 4) behavioral 
control. Liars not only are predicted to exhibit leakage cues or adaptors due to arousal and negative affect, 
but also experience more cognitive overload while managing their lie and appearance. This increased 
vigilance in appearance also causes over-control of normally automatic and natural interaction gesturing, 
causing rigid and inhibited behavior. If a liar does not experience fear or arousal, then cognitive or 
behavioral control cues would be more diagnostic.  
During communication, people attempt to manage and create an impression of themselves (Jones & 
Pittman 1982). This self-presentational perspective was applied to deception theory by DePaulo (1992) to 
elaborate on how behavioral control affects deceivers. Liars attempt to present themselves as truthful and 
honest through their verbal and nonverbal behavior. Because they are consciously modifying their 
behavior, it appears unnatural or artificially inhibits gesturing. This perspective predicts that a liar’s 
behavior will be moderated by their communication ability, motivation, and confidence.  
Buller and Burgoon introduced Interpersonal Deception Theory (1996) to include the entire deceptive 
interaction. This theory emphasizes that deception is strategic and involves a complex interaction between 
at least two people. Depending on the skill of the liar and their relationship in the interaction (e.g., boss, 
parent, loved one), they are predicted to employ different strategies for managing a credible presentation. 
Time and the interplay between sender and receiver are important additions to this theory. A liar may 
start out feeling confident and reveal few behavioral cues to deception, but after sensing suspicion, begin 
over compensating and exhibiting unnatural gestures. As the conversation continues, they may have to 
think harder to keep their lie credible and consistent, leading to increased cognitive effort induced 
behavior.  
CIT-based Automated Interviewing Systems 
Traditional interviewing methods designed to identify deception often require a time consuming process 
during which preliminary interviews are conducted and interviewees are directly queried concerning their 
involvement in a given crime or incident of interest. In some cases, homogeneous physiological measures 
are recorded concurrently, providing the interviewer with data to scrutinize when making a credibility 
assessment. The interviewer then utilizes a combination of both objective data and subjective observations 
to render a decision. This process may yield inaccurate veracity judgments as data may be misinterpreted 
or subjective judgments may overrule objective data. 
To remedy this approach, an alternative interviewing method was proposed several decades ago, which 
has since been heavily researched and validated in the scientific community. This method is the Concealed 
Information Test (CIT), also known as the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) (Lykken 1959; Lykken 1960). The 
CIT was developed with the purpose of identifying a person's knowledge of a given event or piece of 
information by judging whether he or she perceives event-relevant information to be personally 
significant. For example, a suspect accused of robbing a bank could be tested on his or her familiarity with 
the type of door on the bank vault or the amount of money that was stolen. Because this approach 
produces a strong individual baseline of comparison it has a significantly reduced rate of false positives. 
During a CIT interview, an individual is presented with a question or statement together with groups of 
stimuli referred to as foils. Foils are comprised of two types of stimuli, target items and nontarget items. A 
target item is a stimulus that is related to the crime or information of interest, one that should elicit an 
atypical physiological or behavioral response from someone who recognizes it. Nontarget items are mixed 
in with the target items in each foil to serve as controls; they should not elicit any differences from truthful 
or deceptive individuals. The strength of the CIT is found in administering a test comprised of several foils 
as the chances are low of a truthful individual randomly exhibiting indications of concealed knowledge on 
several target items. Another strength is the more objective nature of both administering and interpreting 
results from the interview. 
While commonly researched from the perspective of criminal justice or applied psychology, IS researchers 
are also leveraging the simplicity and control of the CIT for conducting automated credibility assessments. 
For example, CITs are now being evaluated in security screening scenarios (Proudfoot et al. 2012; Twyman 
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2012; Twyman et al. 2011a) and for use in survey tools while keystrokes are recorded and analyzed to 
identify deception and concealed information (Valacich et al. 2013).  
Countermeasures 
Because psychophysiological deception detection is based on detecting a physiological response to a 
stimulus, the employment of measures used to appear innocent is a threat to the validity of any test. 
Countermeasures have been shown to be effective in many deception detection tests, including the 
polygraph (e.g., Ben-Shakhar and Dolev 1996; Honts et al. 1996; Honts et al. 1985; Honts et al. 1987), 
P300-based neural activity detection tests (e.g., Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Sokolovsky et al. 2011), and 
fMRI-based tests (Ganis et al. 2011). 
In the case of the CQT and the CIT, the psychophysiological detection of deception is based on responses 
differing from irrelevant to relevant items. In the case of the CQT, the expected difference in response is 
between control questions and relevant questions. For the CIT, the difference is between nontarget and 
target items. In either case, the response differing in the expected direction indicates the presence of 
deception. 
Countermeasures function primarily by manipulating the participant’s response to the irrelevant items to 
minimize the difference when the relevant item or question is asked. Countermeasures fall primarily into 
two categories: mental and physical. Physical countermeasures include finger movements (Ganis et al. 
2011), pressing toes against the floor (Honts et al. 1996; Honts et al. 1985; Honts et al. 1987), or biting the 
tongue (Honts et al. 1985; Honts et al. 1987). These physical countermeasures are employed during a 
portion of the irrelevant items in either a CQT or CIT. They work by creating a similar physiological 
response to irrelevant items to what the guilty show during relevant items. Mental countermeasures 
include mental counting (Elaad and Ben-Shakhar 1991; Honts et al. 1996), recalling past emotional events 
(Ben-Shakhar and Dolev 1996), or simply saying your first and last name in your head (Sokolovsky et al. 
2011).  
Depending on the test, mental countermeasures are either employed during the irrelevant items only or 
during all items. For example, in a polygraph-based study Elaad and Ben-Shakhar (1991) found that 
item-specific mental countermeasures (counting to 10 during the relevant stimulus) increased the overall 
response and made detection easier. On the other hand, counting sheep throughout the length of the test 
decreased detection rates. In a P300-based deception detection experiment Sokolovsky et al. (2011) 
showed that participants who silently said their first and last name during two of four irrelevant stimuli 
were able to modify their responses enough to evade detection.  
Where countermeasures are shown to be effective at manipulating deception detection results, cognitive 
psychology research has turned to detecting countermeasures. Physical countermeasures are especially 
vulnerable to detection. Honts et al. (Honts et al. 1987) showed that 90% of countermeasures users were 
identified using an electromyograph used to measure muscle activity in the legs and head. Similarly, Ganis 
et al. (2011) showed that while slight finger movements reduced detection accuracy in fMRI-based tests, 
they also increased activation of the motor cortex, the part of the brain responsible for movement. 
Increases in reaction time allowed countermeasure detection in P300 mental countermeasures (Rosenfeld 
et al. 2008). The identification of effective countermeasures allows researchers to discover ways to detect 
them. 
This paper proposes a slightly different approach to mitigating countermeasures. In addition to 
investigating the effectiveness of traditional countermeasures on new, non-contact sensors, we propose 
increasing the number and heterogeneity of veracity cues tracked and used in decision making. If 
individuals can be simultaneously attentive to a limited number of activities, then they are less likely to be 
able to counter a credibility assessment system when the system tracks and measures many heterogeneous 
human factors. 
Pupil Dilation 
Changes in pupil dilation can be linked with a number of cognitive functions. Preliminary research 
discovered that changes in pupild dilation can be used to identify activation and arousal in autonomic 
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activity (Goldwater 1972; Nunnally et al. 1967). Additionally, differences in pupillary responses have been 
linked with short-term and long-term memory retrieval (Beatty and Kahneman 1966; Gardner et al. 1975; 
Janisse 1977). A study investigating differences in pupil dilation associated with viewing novel and 
repeated stimuli revealed that pupils exhibit increased dilation when repeatedly exposed to a given 
stimulus (Heaver 2011). The authors referred to this as the Pupil Old/New Effect, or PONE. Additional 
work has replicated this (Maw and Pomplun 2004).  
The orienting response is traditionally the gold-standard human factor of interest in a CIT, and tracking 
electrodermal activity (skin sweatiness) is the standard method for measuring the orienting response. 
However, the physiological activation triggered by the orienting response is not limited to electrodermal 
activity alone. Several physiological changes result, among them being pupil dilation. Within CIT research, 
evidence supports the notion that common mechanism triggers both pupil dilation and electrodermal 
activity in response to concealed knowledge (Bradley et al. 2008). Additionally, changes in pupil dilation 
during a CIT are attributable to simply having concealed knowledge and not necessarily to any concurrent 
deceptive behaviors, such as verbally lying (Janisse and Bradley 1980). 
The use of pupil dilation as a cue to deception is dependent on the differential response to the target item. 
The arousal triggered by recognition of the target item causes the pupil to dilate to a much greater extent 
than when viewing other items. The employment of mental countermeasures to artificially increase 
pupillary response to non-target items could help artificially raise the baseline of comparison, resulting in 
a less accurate determination of deception. Because pupil dilation is related to cognitive processing 
(Kahneman 1973), taxing mental tasks can increase pupil dilation on demand. By performing mental 
arithmetic during non-target items, the pupillary response during the target item can thereby be masked. 
Thus, we predict the following: 
 H1: Deceptive individuals will have a larger pupillary response to target items than to non-target 
items. 
 H2: Deceptive individuals using mental countermeasures will exhibit reduced pupil dilation 
differential between target and non-target items compared to deceptive individuals using no 
countermeasures. 
In addition to cognitive effort, pupil dilation can also be triggered by pain. Using electrical stimulation, 
Chapman et al. (1999) showed that pupil dilation increases nearly immediately at the onset of pain, and 
that this dilation increases with increasing pain intensity. Further research has shown that the pupil 
dilation is not only immediate, but lasts for the duration of the pain (Ellermeier and Westphal 1995). 
These results indicate that physical countermeasures such as biting the tongue, as employed in polygraph 
studies, may also work to artificially manipulate the pupil dilation baseline in an automated CIT screening 
paradigm. As with mental countermeasures, causing pain during non-target items should increase the 
pupil dilation, reducing the difference between target and non-target pupil dilation in a CIT. 
 H3: Physical countermeasures will reduce the pupil dilation differential between target and 
non-target items. 
Kinesic Rigidity 
Kinesic rigidity is the constriction of body movement. Rigidity has been found in communication research 
to be an indicator of low veracity during open-ended or semi-structured interviewing techniques (Caso et 
al. 2006; Vrij and Mann 2001). When lying, participants tend to exhibit less overall movement, especially 
expressive or illustrative gestures, and the movement that does occur tends to be spatially constricted and 
appear forced rather than natural (Buller and Aune 1987; Vrij and Mann 2001; Vrij et al. 1996). Recent IS 
research has discovered that this phenomenon is also present in the more controlled CIT interview setting, 
and has developed a method for automatic detection of rigidity via comparison of body movement during 
baseline items to body movement during target items (Twyman et al. 2011b). 
Likely because of the high cost of traditional measurement of rigidity, this cue to deception is not used in 
practice. It has also received almost no attention in countermeasures research. One psychology study 
determined that controlling rigidity is very difficult in semi-structured interviews, at least when trying to 
control it directly (Vrij et al. 1996). However, there are still many unknowns, including the effectiveness of 
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traditional countermeasures, and how well rigidity can be overtly controlled in a highly controlled 
automated screening setting where many behaviors must be controlled simultaneously. 
In semi-structured interviews, rigidity has been hypothesized to stem from cognitive overload, in that 
more cognitive effort is being placed on mentally constructing and relaying a plausible story, leaving fewer 
resources to allocate toward nonverbal presentation, creating less overall movement and more constricted 
movement (DePaulo et al. 1988; Ekman and Friesen 1972). A second theory suggests that rigidity itself 
may be a form of countermeasure, in that because people generally falsely believe that liars exhibit 
increased movement, they purposely minimize their own movement to appear truthful (DePaulo and 
Kirkendol 1989). A third possible explanation is the biologically-driven freeze response that all humans 
experience when confronted with something that is threatening (Gray 1988). Previous IS research 
discovered rigidity in a CIT, which requires no communicative or illustrative movement, so cognitive 
overload will not be a likely driver in the highly controlled, automated format employed by the system 
design we use. It is possible that the root cause is a combination of the freeze response and behavioral 
control.  
The effectiveness of traditional countermeasures on kinesic rigidity is likely low. Physical countermeasures 
do not eliminate the threat or the desire to appear truthful. Mental countermeasures should be effective to 
the extent they not only cognitively distract the examinee, but also help them ignore the potential threat or 
the desire to appear truthful. However, because individuals have to verbally respond and be visually 
attentive, mental countermeasures are limited in how much they can distract. Much research is needed to 
understand these dynamics, but at this early stage it appears unlikely that traditional countermeasures 
will be particularly effective against the rigidity effect. 
 H4: Deceptive individuals will exhibit less overall movement when viewing and responding to a 
target item. 
 H5: Deceptive individuals employing mental or physical countermeasures will exhibit less overall 
movement when viewing and responding to a target item. 
Vocal Pitch 
Vocalics refer to the nonverbal elements of speech. To speak, the diaphragm pushes air out from the lungs, 
through the vibrating vocal folds (Titze and Martin 1998). The frequency of the air affected by the 
vibration of the vocal folds is perceived as the vocal pitch. The intensity of the air pushed by the diaphragm 
is perceived as the volume or loudness of the sound. The vocal fold vibrations are facilitated by muscles 
about the larynx in the vocal tract. Just like other muscles in the body, when an individual experiences 
stress or arousal the larynx exhibits tension. Tension around the larynx cause the vocal folds to increase 
the frequency of vibration, thereby increasing the overall variation of vocal pitch.  
Increases in mean and range in vocal pitch have been predictive of deceptive speech (DePaulo et al. 2003; 
Elkins et al. 2012a; Rockwell et al. 1997) and heightened emotions and arousal (Bachorowski and Owren 
1995; Scherer et al. 2003). Because vocal pitch provides primarily emotional arousal-based information, it 
has not traditionally been included in a CIT, which emphasizes orienting responses resulting from 
cognitive arousal. However, it is likely that emotional arousal may be present in the CIT even though it has 
not traditionally been measured. Participants may have relatively heightened feelings of fear or anxiety 
during a CIT.  
 H6: Deceptive individuals will exhibit greater variation in voice pitch when responding to a target 
item. 
Mental countermeasures are expected to be effective for the same reasons as stated previously, specifically 
its distracting qualities. However, physical countermeasures may not cause tension in the larynx, which 
would negate their potential effectiveness. 
 H7: Deceptive individuals using mental countermeasures will exhibit reduced vocal pitch variation 
differential between target and non-target items compared to deceptive individuals using no 
countermeasures. 
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 H8: Deceptive individuals employing physical countermeasures will exhibit greater vocal pitch 
when viewing and responding to a target item. 
It is especially important to determine whether individuals can be successful when they attempt to counter 
many factors at once. Thus, in addition to testing these eight hypotheses, we also investigate whether 
countermeasures are less effective when multiple countermeasures are employed at once. 
Research Approach 
This study followed a design science research (DSR) approach, in which knowledge is discovered through 
the design, implementation, and evaluation of system prototypes (Gregor and Hevner 2013; Hevner et al. 
2004; Nunamaker and Briggs 2011; Nunamaker et al. 1991; Nunamaker et al. 2013). In particular, it 
adheres to the broad-based, high-impact model of DSR, where multidisciplinary programs of research 
pursue solutions to major issues through sustained, interrelated projects that build on one another 
(Nunamaker et al. 2013). Projects iterate through prototyping, experimentation, field studies, and 
theoretical development in a nonlinear fashion. Persistent, sustained projects use the most expedient 
research methods in their quest to push solutions from initial ideation to 1) a proof-of-concept stage, 
where there is sufficient evidence that a concept can work, to 2) a proof-of-value stage, where there is 
sufficient evidence that a concept does work and adds value to real-world situations, to 3) a proof-of-use 
stage, where a concept is making a sustained, real-world impact independent of research (Nunamaker and 
Briggs 2011; Nunamaker et al. 2013). Because of the broad nature of the research approach, contributions 
stemming from the high-impact DSR framework may reference many disciplines, can affect multiple 
disciplines, and can have a broad range, including contributions such as practical field observations, new 
or refined theory, new or refined methods, new or refined design specifications, or a nascent 
understanding of a new problem space.   
The current study represents one part of a larger program of research focused on systems approaches to 
credibility assessment. In line with the research approach, this program of research heavily pulls from 
psychology, communication, psychophysiology, cognitive science, and criminal justice in combination 
with information systems literature.  
Because of the relative novelty of the problem space, a laboratory experiment was an appropriate method 
of investigation at this stage. An experiment was designed to evaluate the ability of deceivers to succesfully 
bypass the automated screening system through the use of countermeasures. The experimental task was 
patterned after a number of experiments designed to test the ability of noninvasive sensors to identify 
deception and concealed information. This was intentional as the findings of previous work could then be 
compared to the results of this study. The experient was comprised of 4 guilty and 1 control condition. 
Three of the four guilty treatments entailed learning countermeasures to defeat the system. Measures were 
repeated within subjects and within question for a total of 20 cases per individual. Detailed information 
about the data collection process and the experimental task is provided in the following subsections. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from undergraduate and graduate business courses at a large southwestern 
university. While the ideal population would be individuals who regularly participate in illicit activities, 
such a population was not feasibly obtainable. Students were selected as a target population as they are 
comprised of individuals from a diverse set of ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Participants (N=175) 
consented to participate and subsequently completed the experiment. The mean age of participants was 
21.86, with a median age of 21, a minimum age of 18, and a maximum age of 36. The sample was 
comprised of individuals with a diverse range of ethnic backgrounds, including: 33% Asian, 3% Black, 1% 
Hawaiian/Islander, 46% White, 13% Hispanic, 3% Middle Eastern, and 1% other. Males accounted for 
59% of the total participants; 41% were female. Over half (126) of the participants spoke english as a 
second language. Of the initial 175 participants, 18 were disqualified because they either failed two 
manipulation check questions or they did not follow instructions (e.g., failed to construct the device). 
Participants received course credit for participation, as well as $20 if they successfully made it through the 
checkpoint and completed their task without arousing suspicion. This was a mild deception to encourage 
personal investment; in reality no participants were required to complete their task beyond the screening  
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Experiment Task 
Each participant was required to provide written consent prior to beginning the experiment. The 
experimental task mirrored Twyman et al. (2011a), except there were additional conditions. After 
providing consent, each individual was randomly assigned to one of the following five conditions: guilty 
with no countermeasures, guilty with mental countermeasures, guilty with physical countermeasures, 
guilty with all (mental, physical, and additional countermeasures), and an innocent (control) group. The 
number of participants assigned to each group was roughly equal. 
Participants in the guilty conditions were tasked with constructing an improvised explosive device, 
concealing it in a bag with standard travel items, and delivering the bag to a person in a secure portion of a 
building. Participants randomly assigned to one of the three countermeasures groups also constructed the 
improvised explosive device and packed it in a bag; however, they also completed training on how to use 
countermeasures to defeat the system. Members of the control group packed only innocuous household 
items in a bag prior to proceeding to the simulated screening; they did not receive any information about 
the system or countermeasures training. After packing the bag, they proceeded to the simulated screening 
environment, purportedly to security screening prior to entry. 
 
Figure 1. Improvised Explosive Device built by participants in Guilty conditions 
Countermeasures training entailed watching a video describing the sensors that would be used during the 
screening interview to identify deception, as well as methods that could be used to thwart the effectiveness 
of the sensors. Participants in the mental countermeasures group were instructed to count backwards by 
seven from a three-digit number. This tactic is designed to occupy the interviewee’s mental processes, 
rendering them cognitively “numb” to the interviewee that is taking place, minimizing any behavioral or 
physiological differences in behavior that could occur. Participants in the physical countermeasures group 
were instructed to moderately but carefully bite their tongue when control items were presented during 
the interview, resulting in physiological responses on control items that could mimic the expected 
response of a guilty person to an item of interest. This should result in a false negative classification as the 
guilty participant should appear more concered about control items than items of interest, and would thus 
appear innocent. The final countermeasures group was trained to use the mental and physical 
countermeasures described previously, as well as to directly controlt kinesic rigidity (not “freeze up”), 
control their voice pitch such that it is always the same, keep a neutral facial expression, and to look at all 
images naturally, not focusing on one item on the screen more than another. 
All participants entered the screening environment, placed the packed bag on a counter, and stood in front 
of the automated screening system. The system was designed to identify the presence of an interviewee 
and begin the interview autonomously. The first step of the interview entailed calibration of the 
interviewee to the eye tracking device. During this process, the person must fixate their eye gaze on nine 
different locations on the screen, resulting in a more accurate and consistent oculometric data collection. 
After calibration, the screening interview commenced, which entailed displaying 5 slides containing 
images of banned items to the interviewee. Each slide contained four small images of banned items 
(Figure 2), and an embodied conversational agent (ECA) asked the interviewee “Are you carrying any of 
these items?” immediately prior to the display of each screen. The interviewee was given five seconds to 
respond before the question repeated and the next slide appeared. Participants were asked to vocally 
respond either yes or no. One of the five slides contained the target item, which was an image that 
resembled an explosive device. Participants in the guilty conditions had to verbally lie in response to this 
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question to appear truthful. The five-slide (foil) was repeated four times, with the slide order and the 
spatial location of the images randomly changed each time. In total, each participant responded to 20 
questions, four of which required an outright lie. 
 
Figure 2. Example slide used in the automated screening 
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Figure 3. Automated screening kiosk used to question participants 
After the screening, each participant completed a brief survey designed to check experimental 
manipulations and to collect information on their experience during the interview. 
Measures 
Kinesic data was captured using a Microsoft Kinect sensor, by capturing the 3-dimensional cartesian 
coordinates of 20 distinct body points in real time at approximately 30 Hz. This raw data was used to 
calculate overall movement via the same procedure detailed in previous work on automated rigidity 
detection (Twyman 2012; Twyman et al. 2011b). This raw data was averaged by participant (N=157) and 
slide (N=20) for each body point. There was one case of lost data due to malfunction, leaving 62,780 data 
points. 
Pupillometry was measured via an EyeTech TM3 eye tracking sensor. The TM3 captured pupil diameter at 
approximately 30 Hz. The mean pupil diameter for both eyes was calculated for each measurement, then 
this data was likewise summarized by participant and slide. Technical malfunctions occurred on 2.6% of 
slides, leaving 3,058 usable data points. 
Raw vocal data was captured using an array microphone at 48 kHz. For each response, the maximum, 
mean, and standard deviation of vocal pitch from the beginning to the end of an utterance of a “no” 
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response, were extracted from the raw vocal data. Technical malfunctions occurred on 5.6% of slides, 
leaving 2,994 usable data points. 
To control for effects stemming from highly variable interpersonal differences such wide variance in 
nervousness, stillness, eye size, and vocal range, the data points from each of these indicators were 
standardized using within-subject z-scores (Ben-Shakhar 1985), meaning each subject’s observations were 
representative of a personal baseline as opposed to a population baseline. All observations were also 
standardized within-foil, to take advantage of the question-specific baseline. In the case of body 
movement, movement was also standardized for each body point separately to account for natural 
differences  in movement patterns between body points.   
Analysis and Results 
Because of the relative novelty of vocal measurements in a CIT context, vocal pitch variation underwent a 
preliminary analysis to explore the three possible measures of variation. Then, separate multilevel 
regression analyses were performed for each veracity cue.  
The vocal measures investigated were: mean pitch, pitch standard deviation, and max pitch. As with body 
movement and pupil dilation cues, each of these variables were normalized within subject and foil before 
being submitted to repeated measures ANOVA (Condition X Target Item). The interaction of Condition 
and Target Item was not significant for mean pitch (p=.28) or pitch standard deviation (p=.065). Max 
pitch, a measurement of high-end pitch range, was significant for the Condition and Target interaction, 
F(4, 2989)=2.32, p=.05.  
For each target deception indicator of interest, a multilevel regression model was specified with the 
indicator as the dependent variable. The dependent variables are standardized scores and thus represent 
standard deviations from an individual’s baseline. In each case, the independent variables include Target 
Item (a binary variable indicating whether the stimuli slide included an IED image), Time (a value 
between 1 and 4 representing the temporal order of the four foils), and the Condition (the four guilty 
conditions were dummy coded using the Innocent condition as a baseline). Interaction effects between 
Condition and Target Item were included to test hypotheses. The results of the separate multilevel models 
are in Table 1. 














(Intercept) 0.007  0.090* 0.077 
(0.010) (0.045) (0.047) 
Target Item -0.026 -0.074 -0.247** 
(0.019) (0.082) (0.086) 
Time 0.000 -0.008** -0.003 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Guilt 0.015  -0.123* -0.061 
(0.012) (0.053) (0.056) 
Mental Countermeasures (MC) 0.019  -0.167** -0.049 
(0.013) (0.054) (0.057) 
Physical Countermeasures (PC) 0.041** -0.128* -0.070 
(0.013) (0.054) (0.057) 
All Countermeasures (AC) 0.013  -0.204*** -0.040 
(0.012) (0.054) (0.056) 
Guilt  X  Target Item -0.076** 0.611*** 0.304* 
(0.027) (0.119) (0.124) 
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MC  X  Target Item -0.097*** 0.835*** 0.243 
(0.028) (0.121) (0.130) 
PC  X  Target Item -0.203*** 0.639*** 0.348** 
(0.028) (0.121) (0.128) 
AC  X  Target Item -0.063* 1.022*** 0.198 
(0.028) (0.121) (0.126) 
    
N 62780 3058 2994 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; models fit using maximum likelihood 
Each model was compared to an unconditional multilevel regression model that excluded fixed effects, 
and each explained significantly more variance. The unconditional model partitions the variance across 
participants unconditioned by predictor variables. Comparing the unconditional models against each of 
the models allows for testing if the inclusion of the predictors significantly improves the fit of the model to 
the data (Singer and Willett 2003) before examining the fixed effects. 
Kinesic Rigidity 
Kinesic rigidity was detected among all groups who were smuggling the IED. When the target item was 
present on the screen, Guilty (b=-0.076, p=.006), physical countermeasures (b=-.203, p=.000), mental 
countermeasures (b=-.097, p=.001), and all countermeasures (b=-.063, p=.024) groups exhibited rigidity. 
Those performing only physical countermeasures showed the greatest amount of rigidity, large enough to 
create a significant net positive main effect in that condition because of the standardized scoring method.   
Pupil Diameter 
When the target item (IED image) was displayed on the screen while an examinee responded to a 
question, pupil dilation was significantly larger for participants in the Guilty (b=.611, p<.001), mental 
countermeasures (b=.835, p<.001), physical countermeasures (b=.639, p<.001) and all countermeasures 
(b=1.022, p< .001) group, which showed the largest effect. There were relatively narrow pupil main effects 
of each condition resulting from the pronounced pupil dilation that occurred when target items were 
present, since all items were standardized within foil. 
Vocal Pitch Variation 
Max pitch was selected as the dependent variable for vocal pitch variation in the multilevel regression 
model detailed in Table 1. Both physical (b=.348, p=.007) and guilty without countermeasures (b=.304, 
p=.014) conditions demonstrated increases in max pitch when responding to target items. The mental 
countermeasures condition did not achieve significance, b=.24, p=.06. The condition using several 
countermeasures was not significantly different from the innocent condition, b= .19, p=.12. 
Discussion 
This study was a novel examination of countermeasures in automated interviewing systems, an emerging 
paradigm in IS research. This is also the first study exploring a systems solution to countermeasures in the 
field of automated credibility assessment. Traditional countermeasures had limited effectiveness against 
automated interviewing systems in CIT-driven interviews. The results also suggest that there is potential 
in the proposition that tracking multiple heterogeneous veracity cues will decrease the effectiveness of 
countermeasures. 
Summary of Results 
Overall body movement and pupil dilation had been investigated in CIT interviews previously, and the 
results replicated prior work showing kinesic rigidity (H4) and dilated pupils (H1) during presentation of 
target items. Traditional countermeasures were not effective at countering these behavioral and 
physiological responses, in agreement with rigidity predictions (H5) but contrary to expectations for pupil 
dilation (H2, H3). Pupil dilation was the strongest effect among those investigated and appeared to be the 
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most resilient to countermeasures. The pupil dilation resulting from the orienting response was strong, 
and there was no decrease in this effect when mental distraction or pain was used.  
Vocalic features had been explored in alternative interviewing protocols, and those studies indicated 
variation in vocal pitch stemming from increased anxiety or tension may be exhibited in CIT responding. 
Participants in the guilty with no countermeasures condition exhibited greater variation in max vocal 
pitch, as did those in the physical countermeasures condition, as hypothesized (H6, H8). The prediction 
that vocalic variance changes could be countered by mental countermeasures (H7) was supported.  
The vocal findings from this study reveal that max vocal pitch could be used to discriminate between guilty 
and innocent speakers during a traditional or automated CIT. When countermeasures are employed, the 
effective method against vocal detection was using mental countermeasures. Mental countermeasures 
were successful even when employing many countermeasures at the same time, possibly suggesting that 
individuals find vocal manipulation easier than other countermeasures such as controlling body 
movement or pupil dilation.  
Attempting many countermeasures at the same time proved difficult. When individuals tried to control 
many things at once, the pupil dilation effect was strongest. Physical countermeasures produced the 
strongest levels of rigidity. These findings may be used used to detect specific countermeasures. 
Contributions 
By investigating countermeasures in a new domain (automated screening systems using non-contact 
sensors), this IS study is breaking new ground. However, we should learn from related work that has 
sought to approach the countermeasures problem. Frequently, when new tests or protocols are developed, 
they are initially claimed to be resistant to countermeasures (e.g., Lykken 1960; Rosenfeld and Labkovsky 
2010a; Rosenfeld et al. 2008). In many cases, the matter is not that countermeasures will not work, but 
simply that the same countermeasures previously employed in other deception detection tests do not 
apply in the new test. Lykken (1960) claimed that the newly developed CIT (then called the Guilty 
Knowledge Test) was resistant to countermeasures. Later, several countermeasures were shown to reduce 
the accuracy of Lykken’s CIT method (Honts et al. 1996) using the polygraph. The same phenomenon 
occurred in the P300 based test with the advent of the Complex Trial Protocol (Rosenfeld et al. 2008). The 
countermeasures previously used on the P300 were shown to be easily detected using the new protocol. 
However, Sokolovsky et al. (2011) and Hu et al. (2011) both showed that a slightly modified version of the 
countermeasure was able to reduce accuracy substantially. 
The approach to countermeasures in this study took a similar approach, but with an added 
systems-inspired proposition—triangulating on deception through measurement of multiple behavioral 
and psychophysiological anomalies simultaneously. The findings presented in this paper suggest that this 
approach may be effective in some areas (e.g., pupil dilation and body movement), but not others (e.g., 
vocal pitch). The results are promising enough to justify additional research investigating countermeasure 
combinations at a more granular level.  
The study presented in this paper makes an important contribution to IS credibility assessment literature 
as it contains a seminal evaluation of the effectiveness of countermeasures against systems designed to 
identify deception and concealed information in an automated credibility assessment context. 
Technologies that can identify deception and concealed information rapidly and without contact have the 
potential to be used in a variety of interviewing and screening contexts, changing how integrity and 
security are managed. As with the polygraph, these new credibility assessment systems will encounter 
some individuals who will attempt to mitigate their effectiveness through the use of countermeasures. 
Ultimately, the results of this study will feed back into the system design, driving revised detection 
algorithms, refined interactions, and key procedural modifications. Thus, this study represents one step in 
a much larger effort to create system-driven solutions to credibility assessment. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of this work is the set of countermeasures used by participants in the countermeasures 
treatments. The countermeasures taught to participants had been identified in previous deception 
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literature, however, these countermeasures were traditionally employed to thwart polygraph 
examinations. While the concept of using countermeasures to create bogus physiological and behavioral 
responses certainly applies to the sensors used in this study, there may exist additional countermeasures 
more suited for use against sensors not requiring contact with the interviewee. As such, an area of future 
research is the identification of new types of countermeasures that may be employed specifically for use 
against the sensors evaluated in this research. Future work should also assess the effectiveness of these 
novel countermeasures. 
Training is a particular limitation of this study, since participants had but a few minutes to learn 
countermeasures and practice them on their own. It is reasonable to believe that countermeasure 
effectiveness may improve with greater training and practice, and future studies should examine the 
effects of various levels of training. However, relatively small amounts of practice represents the large 
majority of real-world attempts to counter credibility assessment interviews. Individuals rarely train for 
extended periods before taking a polygraph exam or smuggling illicit items into a sports arena or secure 
building. Nevertheless, highly motivated individuals will do extensive training, and the effectiveness of 
such training is an open area of research. Future research can examine this using an experimental design 
similar to the current study, but including varying levels of training and practice. 
Another type of countermeasures less commonly studied in academic literature is the chemical 
countermeasure. Bradley and Ainsworth (1984) studied the effects of intoxication during the crime on the 
detection of deception during both the CIT and CQT following the crime. Intoxication during the 
commission of the crime reduced the detection accuracy of both tests as compared to sober participants. 
There are significant ethical challenges to conducting examinations of chemical-based countermeasures 
which prevented our including them in this round. However, future research will need to address this 
issue, perhaps via a standoff intoxication identification function.  
Finally, another area of future research is investigating the interrelationships between disparate cues of 
deception, correlating newly identified cues in automated screening with validated deception detection 
cues such as electrodermal variation. Simultaneously collecting behavioral and psychophysiological data 
using a variety of sensors should yield new insights regarding the underlying relationships of the 
mechanisms triggering certain responses associated with deception. Insights gleaned in this area will yield 
important findings not only for improving detection accuracy but also illuminating theoretical 
understanding of deception and its accompanying cues.  
Conclusion 
This study examined the effectiveness of countermeasures in the newly emerging field of automated 
human interviewing systems. These new systems employ non-traditional measurement and new 
techniques, and the effectiveness of countermeasures was unknown. The results show that traditional 
countermeasures were largely ineffective, as were attempts to also employ direct countermeasures 
alongside traditional ones. Future research will seek to further confirm the notion that an effective system 
for combating countermeasures is one that tracks multiple, distince psychophysiological and behavioral 
indicators of deception simultaneously. 
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